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Abstract: Aristotle and Plato were the chief architects of virtue ethics, but their own formulation of 
virtue ethics was mostly subdued with the appearance of consequentialism as well as Kantian 
deontology. However, modem thinkers have attempted to revive virtue ethics in its new form and in 
this regard the name which is popularly known is G.E.M. Anscombe. In fact Anscombe clearly 
indicates in what sense virtue ethics can be revived and what was wrong with the traditional v irtue 
ethics as expounded by Aristotle and Plato. Anscombe points out three important issues for which 
traditional virtue ethics perhaps lost its glory. First, moral philosophy in general cannot survive 
without an adequate philosophy of psychology and this  thing was absent in the traditional virtue 
ethics. Secondly, without psychological possibility the concepts of moral obligation and moral duty, 
the moral sense of ought to be jeopardized. Thirdly and importantly, the differences between the 
well-known Eng lish writers on moral philosophy from Sidgwick to the present day are of little 
importance. This task of this paper is to review the revival of virtue ethics.   
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According to Anscombe the philosopher 
having the conceptual understanding of 
traditional virtue ethics as well as modern 
interpretation of virtue ethics can easily 
realise what are lacking in the traditional 
virtue ethics as propounded by Aristotle. 
Very interestingly, the crucial term 'moral' 
as interpreted by Aristotle cannot find its 
relevance in modern sense (Anscombe 
2011). Aristotle distinguishes virtues as 
moral as well as intellectuals and what he 
designates 'intellectual' virtues what we 
should call a moral. This is so, because a 
failure of intellectual virtue may be 
blameworthy. However, this should not be 
universalized. According to Anscombe, 
Aristotle confuses the idea of moral blame as 
if he (Aristotle) conceived the idea of moral 
blame as opposed to any other, then why has 
he not considered it more central? For 
Anscombe, there are some mistakes not of 
involuntariness in action, but of scoundrels 
for which a man is blamed. Anscombe says, 
"If someone professes to be expounding 
Aristotle and talks in a modern fashion 
about 'moral' such-and-such, he must be 
very imperceptive if he does not constantly 
feel like someone whose jaws have 
somehow got out of alignment: the teeth 
don't come together in a proper bite” 
(Darwall 2013, p. 4). Therefore, one should 
not follow Aristotelian form of virtue ethics, 
Anscombe opines, in order to formulate a 
revival form of virtue ethics. He further 
contends that all the leading ethical thinkers 
in modern times, from Butler to Mill, lost 
their glory in the revolution of the 
revivalism of virtue ethics.  
Having been deviated from the 
contemporary moral philosophy, Anscombe 
sets out the norms in human virtues. He 
metaphorically says that just like humans 
have the teeth, a man to be a virtuous must 
possess some virtuous qualities. Virtuous 
quality is not a single one, but there are 
clusters of qualities which are virtuous 
qualities. We have already seen that Plato 
admits four cardinal virtues and many 
others have considered justice is the prime 
characteristic of virtue. Anscombe says that 
just as man has so many teeth, so the species 
of man just not biologically but from the 
point of view of the activity of thought and 
choice in regard to the various departments 
of life has such and such virtues. 
Accordingly, a particular man, Anscombe 
opines, with the complete set of virtues is 
the 'norm', as 'man' with, e.g. a complete set 
of teeth is a norm. Here the notion of 'norm' 
is nearly conceived in the Aristotelian sense 
rather than a law or legislation conception 
of ethics as expounded by the deontologists. 
It appears that in advocating the 
revival trend of virtue ethics, Anscombe 
does not rule out the relevance or influence 
of external forces or moral luck in 
considering what is just and what is unjust. 
This again goes against the standpoint of 
deontology. Since what is just and what is 
unjust is relative and one cannot determine 
it without specifying examples as well as the 
consequence of the action under 
consideration, it can be said that what is just 
in one situation might be unjust in other 
situation. Consequence of an action plays an 
important rule in some cases for 
determining what is just and what is unjust. 
Now as far as intrinsic unjust is concerned, 
it can be said that it a procedure is one of 
judicially punishing a man for what he is 
clearly understood not to have done, there 
can be absolutely no argument about the 
description of this as unjust. No 
circumstances and no expected 
consequences can modify the description of 
it as unjust. Someone who attempted to 
dispute this would only be pretending not 
to know what 'unjust' means, for this is a 
paradigm case of injustice. According to 
Anscombe in the case so far discussed the 
term 'unjust' has established the 
superiority over the term 'morally right' 
and 'morally wrong'. Moral philosophers 
since Sidgwick onward discussed whether 
it might be 'morally right' in some 
circumstances to adopt that procedure; but 




this does not make sense to say that the 
procedure would in any circumstances be 
unjust. 
 
UNDERSTANDING MORAL OBLIGATION: 
A NEW OUTLOOK  
 
Morality being a variety of ethical thought 
has its own spirit, aims and it implies a 
general picture of ethical life (Sasa 2019: 
Okpo 2020). These are said to the genesis of 
morality which can only be flourished 
through moral obligation. In fact the term 
'obligation' is a general term and it can even 
be used by the laymen as well, but when we 
are talking of 'moral obligation', we are 
thereby specifying a different sort of ethical 
outlook. The philosopher who was given the 
purest, deepest, and most through 
representation of morality is Kant. The new 
approach of virtue ethics thinks the other 
way round. It holds that morality is not an 
invention of philosophers, it is not 
something compartmentalize, rather 
morality is the outlook of almost all of us. In 
the contemporary moral system particularly 
in the deontological system moral obligation 
is expressed as a kind of deliberative 
conclusion which is directed towards what 
to do. Such conclusion is governed by moral 
reasons and concerned with a particular 
situation. It is also said that moral obligation 
is a kind of practical conclusion. It is an 
obligation to do something with respect to 
an action known as agent's power. Ought 
implies can is a formula famous in this 
connection. The other notable aspect of such 
morality is that moral obligations cannot 
conflict with each other, i.e. there is no 
possibility or chance of moral dichotomy in 
moral obligations. This leads us to say that 
what I am obliged to do must be in my 
power. In this sense, if I am obliged to do X 
and equally obliged to do Y, then I am 
obliged to do X and Y. This in fact reflects the 
practical aspect of the notion of moral 
obligation.  
However, the revival trend of virtue 
ethics anticipates or rather admits moral 
conflict in moral obligations which is 
completely foreign in deontology. 
Philosopher such as David Ross conceives a 
terminology for discussing the conflict of 
obligations. In this regard, he distinguishes 
between prima facie and actual obligations. 
A prima-facie obligation is a conclusion 
supported by moral considerations, which in 
turn is a candidate for beings one's actual 
obligation. According to Ross a merely 
prima-facie obligation can come to support 
some other actual obligation. If I have for 
good and compelling reasons broken a 
promise, I may acquire an actual obligation 
to do something else because of that it is 
therefore not clear at all why I should be 
under this further obligation, because in 
such a case no actual obligation has been 
broken for which I should blame myself. In 
fact I may blame myself for something else 
such as getting into the situation, but it is 
mistaken to blame or reproach myself for 
not doing the rejected action. Does it then 
make sense to say that moral obligation is 
inescapable? When one makes a promise, he 
thereby acquires an obligation voluntarily. 
Likewise one can make a promise non-
voluntarily. In the case of non-voluntary, the 
person under consideration has no choice of 
his own.    
However, according to the theory of 
deontology, once I am under the obligation. 
there is no point of escaping it (Heinzelmann 
2018). And the fact that given agent would 
prefer not to be in this system or bound by 
its rule will not excuse him nor will blaming 
him be based on a misunderstanding. Blame 
is the characteristic reaction for the morality 
system. However, it is possible for particular 
agents who belong to the system never to 
blame anyone in the sense of expressing 
blame. They might be scrupulously skeptical 
about what in other people's power. The 
important point is that self-blame or 
remorse requires one's action to have been 
voluntary is only a special application of a 
general rule that blame of anyone is directed 
to the voluntary. Unlike the law of an actual 
liberal republic, the moral law is more 
exigent as it allows no emigration. In the 
respect, utilitarianism is a marginal member 
of the morality system. It may usually think 
that blame and other social reactions should 
be allocated in such a way that will be 
socially useful. This leads us to say that 




applying the utilitarian criterion to all 
actions, including the social actions of 
expressing blame and so forth. However, a 
utilitarian may ask whether the most useful 
policy might not be to forget that the point of 
blame, on utilitarian grounds, was 
usefulness. Utilitarians are often immensely 
conscientious people as they work for 
humanity. They think this is what they 
morally ought to do and feel guilty if they do 
not live up to their own standards (Gettell 
2019). It is because of such motivations, 
utilitarianism in most versions is a kind of 
morality. 
The view that moral obligation is 
inescapable holds that what I am obliged to 
do is what I must do. It is said to be the first-
personal end which even states that moral 
obligation applies to people even if they do 
not want to do. The third personal aspect is 
that moral judgment and blame can apply to 
people even if they want to live outside that 
system altogether. In Kant's term, we may 
incorporate these two aspects in saying that 
moral obligation is categorical (Cummiskey 
1990). One way in which the central, 
deontological, version of morality deals with 
them is to try to make as many as possible 
into obligations. In fact William David Ross 
(2011) lists several types of what he regards 
as general obligations besides prima-facie 
obligations. Ross understands general 
obligations as duties. Prima-facie obligation 
includes what everyone calls an obligation, 
keeping promise, telling the truth. General 
obligations involve 'duties of gratitude', that 
is to do good to those who have done 
services for you (Kubala 2020). What Ross is 
trying to force into the mould of obligation is 
surely a different ethical idea which he calls 
'duties of justice'. According to Ross these 
duties rest on the fact or possibility of a 
distribution of pleasure or happiness or the 
means thereto which is not in accordance 
with the merits of the persons concerned; in 
which case there arises a duty to upset or 
prevent such a distribution. There are such 
things as duties or obligations of justice and 
the requirements of justice concern, in the 
first place, what ought to happen.  
However, it is a mistake of morality to 
comprehend everything in terms of moral 
obligations. The root, however, is deep. 
What is ordinarily called an obligation does 
not necessarily have to win in a conflict of 
moral considerations. An ordinary moral 
obligation may at times with suitable cause 
be evaded, but a stickiest moralist would 
find a difficulty in the case of moral 
obligation. In fact obligations have a moral 
stringency which means that breaking them 
attracts blame. The only thing that can be 
counted on to cancel this is that the rival 
action should represent another and more 
stringent obligation. Morality encourages 
the idea, i.e. the idea that only an obligation 
can beat an obligation. Although morality 
encourages the idea, but it does not always 
insist on it, at least in the form that an 
obligation of mine can be overridden only by 
another obligation of mine. If some vital 
interest of mine would have to be scarified 
in order to carry out a promise, particularly, 
if the promise were relatively unimportant, 
even the severest moralist may agree that I 
would have the right to break the promise, 
without requiring that I would be under an 
obligation to do so. Gilbert Harman (1999) 
in fact raises this point. This is correct, but 
unless the promise is very trivial, the severe 
moralist will agree. This suggests an 
interpretation under which my obligation 
would indeed be beaten by an obligation, but 
not one of mine. In insisting that only vital 
interests count, it is likely that the moralist, 
when he says that I have the right to 
safeguard my interest, does not mean simply 
that I may do that, but that I have what has 
been called a claim-right to do so. That is to 
say, others are under an obligation not to 
impede me in doing so. If this would be the 
case, then my original obligation will be 
cancelled by an obligation of the promises, 
to waive his or her right to performance. 
Proponents of the revival of the virtue ethics 
suggest that the dictum that only an 
obligation can beat an obligation is 
notoriously a kind of obligation increasingly 
unrecognized in modern cities.  
However, many would like to say that 
Ross's reductionism, i.e. a prima-facie 
obligation is ultimately reduced from 
general obligations would create 
philosophical trouble. If we adhere Ross's 




reductionism, then obligation is allowed to 
structure ethical thought. In order to see 
around the intimidating structure that 
morality has made out of the idea of 
obligation, we need an account of what 
obligations are when they are rightly seen 
as merely one kind of ethical consideration 
among others. This account will help to lead 
us away from morality's special notion of 
moral obligation and eventually out of the 
morality system altogether. Those who are 
within the morality system usually think 
that morality is important. Morality by its 
definition is something to do with personal 
conduct, something to do with deliberation. 
Kantian view also locates the importance of 
morality in the importance of moral 
motivation itself. Kant tells us that the 
power of moral law does not lie and could 
not conceivably lie in anything outside 
oneself. Its power lies in its objective 
foundation and no experience could 
adequately represent that kind of 
objectivity (Singleton 2002). For Kant the 
moral objectivity comes this, that the 
requirements of practical reason will be 
met only by leading a life in which moral 
consideration play a basic and 
characteristic role. The sense of reverence 
for the law holds the key of experience. 
There is one sense in which the law is 
rightly represented by the experience as 
being outside me and it is equally in other 
people. The moral law is the law of the 
notional republic of moral agents who are 
real agents because it is rationally self-
imposed by each of the moral agent. For 
Kant it is the conclusion of practical 
necessity which locus is deeply inside. What 
is important is that people should give 
moral considerations the highest 
deliberative priority. However, this Kantian 
view is criticized by Hegel on the grounds 
that it gives moral thought no content and 
also it was committed to a double-
mindedness about the importance of the 
world. The content of the moral motivation 
was the thought of obligation to a certain 
things as against mere inclination and the 
need for that thought implied that 
individual were not spontaneously inclined 
to do those things. According to Kant 
morality has an objective foundation and he 
takes the experience of the moral demand 
to represent this foundation. However, 
revival of virtue ethicists seem to have 
conceived that this view of Kant 
significantly misrepresents it. In fact, the 
experience is like a law that is part of the 
world in which one lives. However, if we 
deviate from Kant's own account of 
morality, then we can conceive experience 
in a different way.  
As ethical considerations are in 
question, the agent's conclusion will not 
usually be solitary, because they are part of 
an ethical life shared with others. In this 
respect the morality system itself, with its 
emphasis on the 'purely moral' and personal 
sentiments of guilt and self-reproach, 
actually conceals the dimension in which 
ethical life lies outside the individual. 
Moreover, if we admit that the recognition of 
obligation is the center of ethical experience, 
we thereby are building ethical life around 
an illusion. Revival of virtue ethicists even 
conceive that even in Kant's own view, this 
experience involves a misrepresentation. 
However, if this experience is special only in 
the psychological mode, i.e. a consequence of 
transposing objectivity from the 
transcendental level to the psychological 
level, then it would be more worse than a 
misrepresentation. In such a case there 
would be nothing for it to represent. Kant 
attempts to show in what sense moral law 
can be applied unconditionally to all people 
even though the people under consideration 
try to live outside it. Those who believe in 
morality, but disbelieve in Kantian 
construction would like to say how moral 
obligation binds those who refuse it. More 
specifically they would like to say how there 
can be a moral law at all. In responding to 
this question, it can be said that just like the 
law of a state applies to a person because he 
belongs to a state that just apply power, 
likewise Kant's moral law applies because as 
a rational agent or being one had a reason to 
apply it to oneself. In fact, when we say that 
someone ought to have acted in some 
desirable way in which he has not acted, we 
at times say that there was a reason for him 
to act in that way. Whatever the reason may 




be, he has violated the moral obligation. 
However, in violating or breaking the 
obligation, he is not necessarily behaving 
irrationally or unreasonably, but badly. In 
fact there are many different ways in which 
people can fail to be what we would ethically 
like them to be. at one extreme there is a 
general deliberative incapacity, at another 
extreme there is sincere as well as capable 
follower of another creed and besides these 
there are people with various weaknesses or 
vices, people who are malicious, selfish, 
brutal, inconsiderate, self-indulgent, lazy, 
greedy and all these people can be part of 
our ethical world. Therefore, there is 
nothing wrong to say that every ethical 
world incorporates all these things and any 
individual life is lined by some of them. 
Therefore, there are chances of many 
violations of obligations, but blame always 
tends to share the particularized, practical 
character of moral obligation in the 
technical sense.  
This would reflect that morality is 
under too much pressure on the subject of 
the voluntary actions on the part of moral 
agents. In fact the blame arising out of 
institution works coherently, because it 
attempts less than morality would like it to 
do. The blame system closely concentrates 
on the conditions of the particular act and it 
is surrounded by other practices of 
encouragement and discouragement, 
acceptance and rejection, which work on 
desire and character to shape them into the 
requirements and possibilities of ethical 
life. However, the problem with the 
traditional sense of morality is that it 
neglects the surrounding and concentrates 
on the particularized judgment. Therefore, 
there is a pressure it to require a 
voluntariness that will be total and will cut 
through character and psychological and 
social determination, and allocate blame 
and responsibility on the ultimate fair basis 
of the agent's own contribution. This in fact, 
as suggested by the revivalist of virtue 
ethics, is an illusion and it is known almost 
to everyone. The purity of morality conceals 
not only the means by which it deals with 
the members of its community but also the 
virtues of those means.  
MORAL STANDARD AND CRITERION OF 
GOOD LIVING: AN ARGUMENT FOR 
VIRTUE  
 
The main objective of any ethical system is 
to set up at the very outset the criterion or 
standard of moral living. That is ethicists are 
keen to reply the question: how should one 
live? Even Socrates in his own time said that 
our primary question in moral philosophy is 
“How should one live?” In Kantian ethics, it 
is said that the moral standard of one’s living 
should be judged in terms of his moral 
actions and every moral action as done by a 
moral agent should be evaluated in terms of 
moral principles which are absolute in the 
sense that there is no exception as far as the 
applicability of the moral principles is 
concerned (Scharding 2019). Kantian 
principle of morality is absolute and 
rigorous as it runs with the moral command: 
‘duty for duty sake’ (Scharding 2019). The 
problem with Kantianism is that it ignores 
non-moral qualities, moral lucks on which 
the moral agent has no control at all. It also 
ignores many other things a moral agent 
cannot ignore in maintaining good life. 
Therefore, the new approach tries to set up 
a moral standard of living which somehow 
or other deviates from the philosophical 
framework of modernity associated with the 
Kantian ideal of the ‘Rational Person’. The 
concept of free will or the concept of the 
autonomy of the will rules out any external 
authority and therefore the self which 
enjoys free will is alienated from the world. 
The new approach therefore seeks a 
new kind of self which is not alienated from 
the external authority. The new approach 
claims that the concepts central to ethics can 
best be understood if they are first 
considered in non-ethical contexts. Ethical 
sphere by no means is separated from the 
rest of life and it is certainly wrong to 
conceive morality in terms of rigorosity, 
autonomy and with the set of contractual 
arrangements. Ethical sphere is a matter of 
our whole mode of life and in this regard the 
practice of learning a language and many 
other human practices require the exercise 
of virtues. The language learner, it is said, 
must exemplify the honesty and the virtue of 




humility. The new approach holds that the 
Kantian ideal of the Rational Person fails to 
incorporate our whole mode of life in the 
sphere of morality. Therefore, it lacks moral 
relevance in the context of human life in 
general. This new approach also tells us that 
human life has no purpose or telos as many 
modern moral systems have anticipated. 
The new approach not only denies Kantian 
form of modality, it equally tries to make a 
bridge between ancient virtue ethics and the 
contemporary works on the virtues. It tries 
to revive the ancient from of virtue ethics 
with some modifications which are 
imminent in the context of life. 
It is important to point out here that 
the outlook of moral value has taken a 
decisive move in the post Kantian moral 
philosophy. Before Kantianism values were 
inscribed in the heavens and guaranteed by 
God. However, in the post Kantian moral 
philosophy the notion of will, more 
succinctly the autonomy of the free will, is 
established as the creator of value. Here the 
sovereign moral concept is freedom or 
possibly courage in a sense which identifies 
it with freedom, will, and power. Act, choice, 
decision, responsibility, independence are 
emphasized in this philosophy of puritanical 
origin and apparent austerity. This image of 
human nature has been the inspiration of 
political liberalism. However, Hume tells us 
that a good political philosophy may not be 
a good moral philosophy. Whatever the case 
may be, emotion plays an important part in 
human life. Kant unlike Aristotle rules out 
the relevance of emotion in moral life. 
Aristotle as we find gives sufficient reasons 
for admitting emotion in the case of 
morality. Unlike Aristotle, Kant holds an 
interesting theory about the relation of the 
emotions to the reason. Kant, we think, did 
not officially admit emotion in morality, but 
when he distinguishes between practical 
love and pathological love, he thereby shows 
the relevance of emotion. He says that in the 
case of practical love, there is no scope of 
emotion as practical love is the outcome of 
rational actions, but in the case of 
pathological love, there is the relevance of 
emotion as pathological love is a mere 
matter of feeling. This again reflects that 
Kant makes a clear distinction between 
empirical psyches from the clean operations 
of the reason. Moreover, in a “Grundlegung 
der Erkenntnistheorie” Kant admits a 
subordinate place to a particular emotion 
which may accompany the recognition of 
duty, but in no way motivates duty for the 
moral law. It is an actual experience of 
freedom, the realization that although 
swayed by passions we are also capable of 
rational conduct- a conduct which is closely 
related with the Kantian conception of the 
Sublime (Gruender 1931). 
Human’s empirical psyche is selfish 
and Kant wanted to find something clean 
and pure outside the mess of the selfish 
empirical psyche. In fact, his enquiry led him 
back again into the self. Now, defending on 
the self-defensive psyche, how can we make 
ourselves better? One may suggest that 
religion can help us as ordinary man with 
the simple religious conceptions has usually 
held a more just view of the matter than the 
voluntaristic philosopher. Religion normally 
emphasizes states of mind as well as actions 
and regards states of mind as the generic 
background of action, such as, pureness of 
heart, meekness of spirit (Allam 2018; Edet 
2019). More importantly, religion gives rise 
to devices for the purification of states of 
mind. For example, prayer can actually 
induce a better quality of consciousness and 
can provide energy for good action which 
would not otherwise be available (Asuquo 
2019). In fact by opening our eyes we do not 
necessarily see what confronts us. We are 
anxiety-ridden animals. Our minds are 
constantly active, fabricating an anxious, 
often falsifying veil which partially conceals 
the world. Our states of consciousness differ 
in quality and if quality of consciousness 
matters, then anything which alters 
consciousness in the direction of 
unselfishness, objectivity and realism is to 
be connected with virtue.  
Good life is not exclusively the 
outcome of reason. Rather it would be the 
outcome of both experience and reason. 
Recent moral philosophy denies experience 
in the case good life, they prefer reason for 
maintaining a good moral life. However, the 
new approach thinks the other way round as 




it holds that experience with beauty plays an 
important role in maintaining good moral 
life. Beauty is the convenient and traditional 
name of something which art and nature 
share and which gives a fairly clear sense to 
the idea of quality of experience and change 
of consciousness. According to Plato beauty 
is the only spiritual thing which we love by 
instinct and when we move from beauty in 
nature to beauty in art we are already in a 
more difficult region. In fact the experience 
of art is more easily degraded than the 
experience of nature (Ramos 2019). A great 
deal of art actually is self-consoling fantasy 
and even great art cannot guarantee the 
quality of its consumer’s consciousness. 
However, great art exists and is sometimes 
properly experienced and even a shallow 
experience of what is great can gave its 
effect. In fact great art invigorates our best 
faculties or more specifically in Platonic 
language, it inspires love in the highest part 
of the soul. Since art is a human product, 
virtues and talents are required of the artist. 
A good artist in terms of his art is brave, 
truthful, patient and humble. The enjoyment 
of art is a training in the love of virtue. Art 
transcends selfish and obsessive limitations 
of personality and the true genesis or 
realism of a great artist is not a photographic 
realism, rather it is essentially both pity and 
justice. 
According to the new approach the 
only thing which is of real importance is the 
ability on the part of moral agent to foresee 
it all clarity and respond to it justly which is 
inseparable from virtue. Perhaps, one of the 
greatest achievements of all is to join this 
sense of absolute morality, not the tragic, but 
to the cosmic. Art therefore stands not as a 
division, rather it is the most educational of 
all human activities and intuits a place in 
which the nature of morality can be seen. Art 
pierces the veil and gives sense to the notion 
of a reality which lies beyond appearance. It 
exhibits virtue in its true guise in the context 
of death and chance. According to Plato 
beauty, a kind of virtue could be a starting 
point of good life. He, however, mistrusts art 
as for him all art is bad art, a mere fiction and 
consolation which distorts reality. As far as 
virtue is concerned, it can be said that virtue 
is a good habit and dutiful action and the 
background condition of such and such 
action is a just mode of vision and a good 
quality of consciousness. It is a task to come 
to see the world as it is. A philosopher who 
leaves duty without a context and exalts the 
idea of freedom and power as a separate top 
level value ignores this task and obscures 
the relation between virtue and reality. 
However, we act rightly not out of strength 
of will but out of the quality of our usual 
attachments and with the kind of energy and 
discernment which we have available and to 
this the whole activity of our consciousness 
is relevant. 
One may attempt to give a logical 
answer of the term Good. For them asking 
what Good is, is asking what truth is or what 
courage is. If we define Good as X, we 
thereby mean of course a good X. In this 
regard, if we say that Good is Reason, we 
have to talk about good judgment and if we 
say that Good is Love, we have to explain 
that there are different kinds of Love. All 
things which are capable of showing degrees 
of excellence show it in their own way. That 
means to say that the idea of perfection can 
only be exemplified in particular cases in 
terms of the kind of perfection which is 
appropriate. However, the point is that 
although one can talk about good painting, 
but one could not say in general what 
perfection is. One can talk about good 
judgment, but the truth of judgments of 
value cannot be demonstrated. This actually 
indicates or suggests that the view of Good is 
empty and almost trivial. The indefinability 
of Good is connected with the unsystematic 
and inexhaustible variety of the world and 
the pointlessness of virtue. In this respect 
there is a special link between the concept of 
Good and the ideas of death and chance. A 
genuine sense of morality enables us to see 
virtue as the only thing of worth and it is 
impossible to limit and foresee the ways in 
which it will be required of us. Good is 
mysterious, because of human fatality. We 
behave well in areas where this can be done 
fairly easily and let other areas of possible 
virtue remain undeveloped. There are few 
places where virtue plainly shines and we 
without improving ourselves cannot see 




these things. It is in the context of such 
limitations that we should picture our 
freedom. Freedom is a mixed concept. It is 
mixed in the sense that it has true half as 
well as false half. Its true half is an aspect of 
virtue connected especially with the 
clarification of vision and the domination of 
selfish impulse and its false half known as 
popular half is a name for the self-assertive 
movements of deluded selfish will, which 
because of our ignorance we take to be 
something autonomous. 
What has been said above is made 
clear with the following observation of 
Plato. Plato has given up the image of 
deluded worship in his great allegory 
(Giannopoulou 2011). The prisoners in the 
cave at first witness the back wall and 
behind them a fire is burning in the light of 
which they see upon the wall the shadows 
of puppets which are carried between them 
and the fire. They take these shadows to be 
the whole of reality. When they turn around 
they can see the fire, which they have to 
pass in order to get out of the cave. Here the 
fire is just like the self, the old unregenerate 
psyche, the great source of energy and 
warmth. The prisoners in the second stage 
of enlightenment have gained the kind of 
self-awareness, which is nowadays a matter 
of so much interest to us. They can see in 
themselves the source of what was formally 
blind selfish instinct. They see the flames 
which threw the shadows which they used 
to think were real, and they can see the 
puppets, imitations of things in the real 
world, whose shadows they used to 
recognize. They do not yet dream that there 
is anything else to see. What is more likely 
than that they should settle down beside the 
fire, which though its form is flickering and 
unclear is quite easy to look at and amusing 
to sit by? It has been said that good is 
indefinable. However, philosophers have 
attempted to conceive Good by making a 
special relation with other concepts, such 
as, Freedom, Happiness, and Courage etc. 
But the problem with this conceivability is 
that they seem to represent in each case the 
philosopher’s admiration for some 
specialized aspect of human conduct which 
is much less than the whole of excellence 
and more importantly at times dubious in 
itself. One may be tempted to say that what 
is Good is love, but the problem with this 
interpretation is that Good and Love should 
not be identified, because human love is 
usually self-assertive. Although Good is 
sovereign over Love, they still play different 
roles. Good is the magnetic centre towards 
which truth or reality is not the outcome of 
abstract intellect modern moralists thinks 
of but of looking and seeing around us. This 
views of moral perception has its roots in 
Aristotle's accounts of practical wisdom of 
the virtuous man who sees the things as 
they are and responds appropriately. The 
good therefore brings unity in to the world 
of chaos and this is made possible of course 
partly through the understanding we can 
have of the relationship between 
hierarchies in the virtues. However, this 
understanding has to be complemented by 
an awakener of the richness and complexity 
of details in everyday situation an 
awareness itself grounded in the life of 
good. 
 
THE SCHIZOPHRENIA OF MODERN 
ETHICAL THEORIES 
 
Philosophers belonging to the revival camp 
of virtue ethics are of the opinions that 
modern ethical theories have suffered from 
schizophrenia (Barry 2016). Moral 
schizophrenia is a kind of moral malady and 
one can witness various kinds of moral 
maladies in modern ethical theories. With a 
few exceptions modern ethical theories such 
as consequentialism as well as deontology 
deal only with reasons. As a matter of fact 
they fail to incorporate motives and the 
motivational structures and constraints of 
ethical life. Ethical theories based on reasons 
but forfeiting motives would not enable to 
produce good moral life. It is contended that 
one inevitable mark of a good life is to make 
a harmony between one's motive and one's 
reasons, values and justification. Therefore, 
to make split between one's motives and 
one's reasons is properly called a moral 
schizophrenia. In fact, an extreme form of 
such schizophrenia is characterized by being 
moved to do what one believes bad, harmful, 




ugly, abasing on the one hand and by being 
disgusted, horrified, dismayed by what one 
wants to do on the other. It is important to 
note here that a good life cannot be 
conceived without motives as our major 
values through which a good life can be 
attained are intimately associated with our 
motives (Balsemão Pires 2020). More 
succinctly, it can be said that we should 
value what our major motives seek.  
A good life is a mark of harmony - a 
moral integration without which human life, 
good or bad, is not possible. This does not, 
however, lead us to say that in all cases 
moral harmony is better to have; rather it 
would better for us if self-seeking 
authoritarians adopt the reason of their 
motives. It is also not to be the case that in 
all areas of endeavour moral harmony is 
necessary for achieving moral value. For 
them motives is irrelevant as far as 
rightness, duty and obligatoriness are 
concerned. However, revivalists of virtue 
ethics would like to say that although 
rightness, obligatoriness and duty are 
without harmony, but there is still a 
question of harmony. What sort of life would 
people have who did their duties but never 
wanted to? Secondly, duty, obligation and 
rightness are only one part, a small part of 
ethics. In fact, there is the whole other areas 
of values of personal and interpersonal 
relations and activities and also the areas of 
moral goodness, merit and virtue where 
motive is an essential part of what is 
valuable. This leads us to say that in both 
these cases motive and reason must be in 
harmony for the values to be realised. 
Therefore, no one can deny that the view 
that moral harmony is a mark of a good life. 
The modern ethical theories fail to give rise 
to a good life as such theories make harmony 
impossible.  
Thus, a good life in the true sense can 
only be provided by the renewal or revival 
trend of virtue ethics. Why is it called 
revival? It is called revival in the sense that 
ethics stats with virtue ethics as propounded 
by Aristotle and Plato. Subsequently, it has 
lost its ground with the appearance of 
consequentialism and deontology. However, 
some philosophers with sufficient grounds 
have realised that a good life can only be 
attained by reviving virtue ethics and this 
can be made possible by making it clear that 
modern ethical theories cannot survive any 
more with the concept of duty, obligations. 
The problem of modern or recent ethical 
systems is that they have over concentrated 
on moral duty, rightness and obligations 
while reflecting on the complexity and 
vastness of our moral life. This is not only 
their failure; besides this they also make a 
mistake by forfeiting the relations of 
motives to values. In the second failure 
virtue revivalists conceive a far more serious 
defect of modern ethical theories than such 
over concentration on duty, obligation and 
rightness. The interlinked between motive 
and reason is overlooked in modern ethical 
theories which according to the virtue 
revivalists is vital as far as understanding of 
morality is concerned. In fact it is the 
pervasive area of value. More succinctly, it 
can be said that by ignoring the moral 
association between motive and reason, 
modern moral theories allow us the 
harmony of a morally impoverished life 
which is deeply deficient in what is valuable 
instead of a morally good life. Therefore, it is 
not possible for people to achieve value, to 
act on these ethical theories, to let them 
comprise their motives. In fact people who 
do let them comprise their motives will have 
a life seriously lacking in what is valuable. 
Therefore, it is assumed that modern moral 
theories are defectively in more then one 
ways. As ethical theories they fail to provide 
the moral agents the good or good life in an 
integrated way. As theories of the mind, of 
reasons and motives, of human life and 
activity, they fail, not only by putting us in a 
position that is psychologically 
uncomfortable, difficult, or even untenable, 
but also by making us and our lives 
essentially fragmented and incoherent. 
There is no question of doubt that loving, 
caring, compassion, friendship, affection, 
fellow feeling, and community or society or 
broadly speaking our environment or 
surroundings are the important sources of 
person pleasure. If this would be the case, 
then can we say that a typical hedonistic 
egoist can get these pleasures? Certainly he 




would not get such pleasures as he adheres 
to the motive of pleasure for self. This, of 
course, does not mean that egoists cannot 
get together and decide to enter into a love 
relationship. Rather they surely like other 
can and they equally can do various things to 
bring about such pleasure. Nonetheless 
there is necessarily something lacking in 
such a life which is unlikely ion the life of a 
virtuous being. That means whatever the 
attempt an egoist happens to make, the 
sense of loving is missing in his life which is 
unlikely in the case of a virtuous being.  
Virtue ethics in its form attempts to 
provide an untroubled life which is 
personally pleasurable to every one 
possessing virtuous (Abakare 2020). 
However, the approach of an egoist is 
different from a virtuous being. He thinks 
the other way round. For him a life is good 
which is personally pleasurable to him alone 
and accordingly he acts in various ways 
towards others with the final goal of getting 
pleasure for himself alone. This leads 
indirectly that he does not act for others. 
This further confirms why egoism is often 
claimed to be essentially lonely. A relevant 
question comes into being here. What would 
be the case if an egoist is transformed into a 
non-egoist and thereby acquiring the virtue 
of caring for others? In responding this 
question it is said that by way of 
transforming an egoist into a non-egoist, the 
concerned person by acquiring the virtue of 
caring for others loses conscious control on 
him as an egoist. The question again arises: 
can an egoist by acquiring the virtue of 
caring for others will be able to cheek up and 
see how his transformed self in getting on in 
achieving egoistically approved goals. Will 
they have a mental alarm clock which in fact 
wakes them up from their non-egoistical 
transforms every in a while? It is really 
difficult to give a clear cut reply without 
question begging. However, what is bad 
enough to have a private personality which 
every now and then encourages one to hide 
from others alienates one from others. 
Therefore, it is concluded by saying that 
egoism in general is defected.  
According to utilitarianisms an act is 
right, obligatory if and only if it is optimistic 
in regard to pleasure and pain and only good 
reason for acting is pleasure vs. pain 
(Gibbard 1973). Accordingly, whatever your 
relation to that person, it is necessarily not 
love, nor is it friendship, affection, fellow 
feeling and community. Here the person you 
supposedly love engages your thought and 
action not for him, but rather as source of 
pleasure. If you try to carry on the 
relationship for the sake of goodness, there 
is no essential commitment even to that 
activity. So far as goodness is concerned, one 
cannot ignore love, i.e. the good of love. 
Accordingly, any person who would elicit as 
much of this good would be a proper an 
object of love as the beloved. The theory tells 
us to bring about this good, but now we do 
foresee that we cannot separate what is 
good, the love from its goodness. This leads 
us to say that just as egoism; utilitarianisms 
in various types necessitate schizophrenia 
between reason and motive as they cannot 
allow for love, friendship, affection, fellow 
feeling, and community. Thus, schizophrenia 
is equally found both in rule utilitarianisms 
as well as in the current deontology.  
What is simply absent in these current 
theories is simply the person, the character. 
For love, friendship, affection, fellow felling 
and community that require that the other 
person be an essential part of what is valued. 
The person must be valued. The defect of the 
current moral theories is that in regard to 
love is not that they do not value love, but 
that they do not value the beloved. A person 
who values and aims at simply love or love 
in general misses the intended beloved. 
Modern ethical theories would prevent each 
of us from loving, caring for, and valuing 
oneself as opposed to loving, caring for, and 
valuing our general values. In these 
externally-ridden theories, there is as much 
a disappearance non-appearance of the self 
as of other people. In fact, their externality-
ridden universes of what is intrinsically 
valuable are not solipsistic; rather, they are 
devoid of all people. Moore's taking 
friendship is to be an intrinsic good is an 
exception here. However, if the previous 
criticism of Moore holds, his so taking 
friendship introduces serious strains, 
verging on inconsistency, into his theory. 




Egoism, in fact, puts people in vulnerable 
position. It treats humans externally or as 
mere instruments and truly speaking these 
ways are dehumanising. Therefore, to say 
much more than this would require a full-
scale philosophical anthropology showing 
how such personal relations as love and 
friendship are possible, how they relate to 
larger ways and structures of human life. 
Therefore, virtue ethics of the revival form 
always insists for the development of those 
relations which are constitutive of human 
life worth living. More importantly, it looks 
at how the fullness of good life, a life of 
eudaimonia in Aristotelian sense, is made 
possible.  
Now the question is: what sort of 
motives people can have if they are to be 
able to realise the great goods of love, 
friendship, affection, fellow feeling, and 
community. Love, friendship, affection, 
fellow feeling, and community essentially 
contain like many others states and 
activities certain motives and essentially 
preclude certain others and among those 
precluded we find motives comprising the 
justifications, the goals, and the goods of 
those ethical theories prominent today. As a 
matter of fact current ethical theories treat 
people externally and to preclude love, 
friendship, affection, fellow feeling, and 
community both with others and with 
oneself. Therefore, to have these great goods 
while holding those current ethical theories 
requires schizophrenia between reason and 
motive. The problem with the prominent 
current ethical theories is that if you hold or 
live the theories directly, you will fail to 
achieve its goal. Thus, charges of 
disharmony, moral cleavage, schizophrenia 
are being maid against the current moral 
theories where the personal relationship of 
love, friendship, affection, fellow feeling and 
community are hard to come by. These 
qualities are essential to make a man as true 
man, a true virtuous being. These are also 
said to be the pyramid of human character 
through which a person enjoys a good life. A 
special case can be cited here to make the 
point clear. Suppose you have been locked 
up in a psychiatrist hospital and are 
naturally most eager to get out. Incidentally 
you ask the psychiatrist when you will be 
released. He replies, "Pretty soon". You 
further find out that instead of telling 
patients what he really believes, he tells 
them what he believes is good for them to 
hear. Perhaps you could 'crack his code' by 
discovering his medical theories and his 
beliefs about you. It might be expected that 
in such case explicitly concerned with 
motives and their evaluation, ethical 
theories would not lead us into this 
disharmony or the corresponding morally 
defective life. Even in regard to moral merit 
and demerit, the moral virtues and vices, the 
situation is not wholly dissimilar. The 
standard view tells us that a morally good 
intention is an essential constituent of a 
morally good act. A morally good intention is 
an intention to do an act for the sake of its 
goodness or rightness. But now suppose you 
are in a hospital recovering from a long 
illness. You are very bored and restless and 
at loose ends when Smith comes in once 
again. You are now convinced more than 
ever that he is a fine fellow and a real friend-
taking so much time to cheer you up, 
traveling all the way across town, and so on. 
However, it reveals at the end that it is not 
essentially because of you that he came to 
see you, not because you are friends, but 
because he thought it his duty or simply 
because he knows of no one more in need of 




It has been observed that recent moral 
theories are concerned entirely with 
rightness, obligation and duty, but not with 
the whole of ethics. On the basis of the 
above observation, it is perhaps clear 
enough by now that recent ethicists have 
ignored largely and extremely important 
areas of morality, such as personal relations 
and that of merit. It the proponents of such 
ethical theories believe that duties, 
obligations and so no really the whole, then 
they were mistaken about the scope and 
importance of duty and so on. They were 
mistaken about these concepts as even a 
brief study of supererogation and self-
regarding notions would indicate. Secondly, 




these theories are dangerously misleading 
as they all too readily be taken as suggesting 
that all of ethics can be treated in an 
external, legislation-model, index way. 
Thirdly, the acceptance of such theories as 
partial theories would pose severe 
difficulties of integration within ethical 
theory. As these theories are so different 
from those concerning personal relations, 
how are they all to be integrated? This 
would reflect how contemporary ethical 
theories come to require either a stunted 
moral life or disharmony, schizophrenia. As 
far as moral legislation is concerned, they 
were concerned with duty, rightness, and 
obligation. When viewing morality from 
such a legislator's point of view, when 
adopting such legislation to be the model, 
ethical motivation appears to be irrelevant 
and more importantly where there is moral 
legislation there is also tied up with a 
general devaluing of our emotions and 
emotional possibilities. All these things 
discussed above may help us to answer a 
question why contemporary ethical 
theories suffer from schizophrenia, 





Abakare, C. (2020). The Origin Of Virtue 
Ethics: Aristotle’s Views. GNOSI: An 
Interdisciplinary Journal of Human 
Theory and Praxis, 3(1), 98-112. 
Allam, O. S. (2018). Unmasking “Alekwu” 
Religious Experience among the 
Idoma People-Group of 
Nigeria. GNOSI: An Interdisciplinary 
Journal of Human Theory and 
Praxis, 1(2), 118-130. 
Anscombe, G. E. M. (2011). Human life, 
action and ethics: essays by GEM 
Anscombe (Vol. 4). Andrews UK 
Limited. 
Asuquo, O. O.  (2019). Humanism as a 
Category of Religious 
Alternative. GNOSI: An 
Interdisciplinary Journal of Human 
Theory and Praxis, 2(1), 30-36. 
Balsemão Pires, E. (2020). Counselling and 
Ethical Theories. Acta Europeana 
Systemica, 8, 315–326. 
https://doi.org/10.14428/aes.v8i1.
56503 
Barry, P. (2016). Schizophrenia and the 
Virtues of Self-Effacement. Les 
Ateliers de L’éthique, 11(1), 29–48. 
https://doi.org/10.7202/1038197a
r 
Cummiskey, D. (1990). Kantian 
Consequentialism. Ethics, 100(3), 
586–615. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/293212 
Darwall, S. (2013). Honor, history, and 
relationship: Essays in second-
personal ethics II. OUP Oxford. 
Edet, F. F. (2019). The concept of worship in 
Islam. Lwati: A Journal of 
Contemporary Research, 16(4), 125-
130. 
Gettell, R. G. (2019). The English Utilitarians. 




Giannopoulou, Z. (2011). Plato and the 
Question of Beauty. Ancient 
Philosophy, 31(2), 412–416. 
https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphi
l201131230 
Gibbard, A. (1973). Doing no more harm 




Gruender, H. (1931). Grundlegung der 
Erkenntnistheorie. Thought: 
Fordham University Quarterly, 6(1), 
125-130. 
Harman, G. (1999, January). Moral 
philosophy meets social psychology: 
Virtue ethics and the fundamental 
attribution error. In Proceedings of 
the Aristotelian society (pp. 315-
331). Aristotelian Society. 
Heinzelmann, N. (2018). Deontology 




Kubala, R. (2020). Aesthetic obligations. 
Philosophy Compass, 15(12), 1–13. 






Okpo, O. (2020). Nigeria’s Traditional Virtue 
Ethics and Business: An Ibibio 
Virtue Ethics Approach to Business 
Ethics. GNOSI: An Interdisciplinary 
Journal of Human Theory and 
Praxis, 3(1), 16-31. 
Ramos, S. (2019). Plato and Kant on Beauty 
and Desire. Epoché: A Journal for the 
History of Philosophy, 24(1), 1–26. 
https://doi.org/10.5840/epoche20
191010142 
Ross, W. D. (2011). Foundations of ethics. 
Read Books Ltd. 
Sasa, M. S. (2019). An Appraisal of the 
Concept of Beauty in Immanuel 
Kant’s Philosophy. GNOSI: An 
Interdisciplinary Journal of Human 
Theory and Praxis, 2(2), 87-97.  
Scharding, T. (2019). Individual Actions and 
Corporate Moral Responsibility: A 
(Reconstituted) Kantian Approach. 




Singleton, J. (2002). Virtue ethics, Kantian 
Ethics, and Consequentialism. 
Journal of Philosophical Research, 27, 
536–551. 
https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr_2002_
16 
 
